Product leadershipTelehealthDeliveryMarket strategy

How our product evolved in a year the market reset

All work

The short version

In October 2025 I took over the product and engineering team at a weight-loss and wellness telehealth company. This is an honest account of the thirteen months since: how the market moved, what we shipped, how the team changed, and which numbers did not go my way.

Delivery clearly got better. We merge more than twice as many changes a month, our automated test count went from a few dozen to nearly a thousand, and releases run through a candidate, a preview and an automatic rollback instead of a push to main. The commercial side is harder: new-account conversion roughly halved, the business now runs mostly on renewals, and our biggest onboarding rebuild moved people forward without moving purchases.

More than 2xmerged code changes a month from August to October, versus earlier in the year
36 to 972automated tests in the main repo, October 2025 to September 2026
About halfthe new-account-to-purchase rate at its Q3 low, versus late 2025
88%of August 2026 payment events were not first purchases (mostly renewals), up from 79% in October 2025

Where things stood in October 2025

The product worked and patients were being treated, but most of what makes a product team fast and safe was missing or manual. The retention work from my first months is in the head of product case study. This is the delivery picture.

Commercially, new patients mattered more then: about 21% of payment events were first purchases. By August 2026 that share was about 12%, and lower again in a partial October.

How the market shifted

Three forces reshaped weight-loss telehealth this year. Branded GLP-1 prices fell and new direct channels opened. Regulators moved from warning about compounded GLP-1s to citing how telehealth companies market them. And peptide and longevity treatments opened up on footing that can still be withdrawn. Everything in this table is public.

The market, October 2025 to October 2026
WhenWhat changedWhy it mattered
Oct to Nov 2025Warehouse and big-box pharmacies added branded GLP-1 injections at cash prices. Federal pricing deals with both GLP-1 manufacturers set cash prices near $350 a month. Google allowed drug names in US ad text.The price anchor telehealth sold against started to fall.
Dec 2025A federal order against a telehealth GLP-1 membership business over hidden costs, unsupported results claims and fake reviews, requiring easy cancellation. 35 state attorneys general pressed Meta on AI-generated weight-loss ads. The first oral GLP-1 for obesity was approved.All-in pricing and easy cancellation became the floor, and paid social creative came under pressure.
Jan to Feb 2026The first GLP-1 obesity pill launched at $149 to $299 a month. A government cash-price drug site launched. FDA said it intended to restrict ingredients used in non-approved compounded GLP-1s.A branded pill at a cash price reset what a fair monthly price looked like.
Mar 202630 FDA warning letters to telehealth companies over "generic" or sameness claims and telehealth brands on product labels. A leading telehealth brand stopped advertising compounded GLP-1s.Copy and imagery became compliance surfaces.
Apr 2026A second GLP-1 weight-loss pill launched, with same-day online pharmacy delivery. FDA proposed keeping semaglutide, tirzepatide and liraglutide off the list outsourcing facilities can compound from (not final).More branded, cheaper, faster options.
Jun to Jul 202625 more FDA letters, again citing labels carrying the telehealth brand. A Medicare GLP-1 bridge opened with a $50 copay. An FDA advisory panel narrowly backed compounding six peptides.Brand imagery on products became a direct risk, and peptides moved toward the mainstream.
Aug to Sep 2026That same telehealth brand reported a sharp fall in gross margin and plans for peptide and longevity products. Telemedicine ad-certification applications were up 101% year over year. Large employers signalled GLP-1 coverage cuts for 2027.The leader was diversifying, paid channels got more crowded, and more people would pay cash.
Oct 2026HHS said it would not enforce against compounding those six peptides under set conditions, a revocable policy.A real but fragile opening for new lines.

Sources: White House pricing deals, Google ads policy, FTC order, first oral approval, FDA, February, FDA, March, FDA, April, Medicare GLP-1 Bridge, HHS peptide policy.

Our own numbers pointed the same way. Paid social was getting more expensive, and first purchases were a shrinking share of our payments.

The way I came to put it: we were not a growth business with a retention problem, but a retention business with an acquisition funnel attached. The roadmap had to say so.

What we shipped, quarter by quarter

The team opened roughly 895 pull requests in thirteen months. Merged changes ran at about 30 to 40 a month through July, then about 80 to 90 a month from August. One copy of the repo history I used is thin for February to April, so read that stretch as possibly under-counted rather than quiet.

Q4 2025: experiments, tracking and upsell

Q1 2026: data safety, payments, pharmacy operations and identity

Q2 2026: new lines, retention events and an onboarding service

Q3 2026: rebuilt patient surfaces and a release system

October 2026: the existing patient becomes the product

The platform underneath

Engineering foundations, then and now
AreaOctober 2025October 2026
Apps and packages4 apps, 5 packages9 apps, 10 packages
Release modelPush to main deploys; ad hoc tagsLane releases with candidate, preview, smoke tests and rollback
CI workflows418
EnvironmentsLocal and stagingPer-pull-request, QA and local cloud emulation
Automated tests36 unit tests972 tests in the main repo, including end-to-end journeys, plus 126 QA-repo tests across about 11 device profiles
Server event definitionsAbout 6986
AI in the repoOne agent guide, 6 commands4 agent guides, 12 agent skills

More tests are not yet a safer pipeline. This autumn the suites still did not gate merges or releases, and making them do so is the next job.

The release pace this produced is in a release every four days. That average hides a ramp: early in the year we deployed on only a few days a month, and the pace picked up from April and especially from July.

How the team changed

The team grew less than the output did. What changed most was how work entered, moved and left.

Team shape at handover and now
RoleLate 2025October 2026
Product managementOne PM laneThree PM lanes: conversion; portal and project coordination; new products and support
EngineeringThree to four active a monthAbout four a month, six across the year
QAA lead and manual testersA lead, about four manual testers, two automation contractors
Design and copyShared with marketing; about one writerTwo product designers; a copy manager and a senior copywriter
WebsiteAn outside teamAn in-house developer

By mid-year I led a team of 16; how I approach that is in building and mentoring a team of 16. One weakness remains: output and launch-night load are still concentrated in a few people.

How we adapted product and channels

Most of what we shipped answered one of four pressures.

Cheaper branded options: earn more from the patients we have

Once branded pills and cash prices reset what a fair price looked like, new patients got more expensive to win and easier to lose. So we leaned harder on the existing base, which we had started doing with add-ons in December.

Enforcement: treat copy and imagery as product

The general lesson: copy, imagery and screening are compliance surfaces, and they deserve the same review as code.

Dearer, weaker paid social: look beyond it

Paid social's share of new accounts rose from about half in late 2025 to close to three fifths through September. It was also our lowest-converting channel, and its account-to-purchase rate fell to about three fifths of its late-2025 level, while search held about four fifths of its own.

Wellness opened up: new lines, launched carefully

New GLP-1 formats launched from July made up about a fifth of labelled checkouts by October; non-GLP-1 lines were still under 3%. One new line first launched only through doctors in the portal, with no landing pages or paid campaigns. With the evidence for many wellness and peptide treatments still thin, and the rules around them changing month to month, that caution seems right to me.

What the numbers say

Every figure is a ratio or an index, mostly from server-side events. October 2026 is a partial month.

The patient funnel, then and now
MeasureThenNowReading
New account to purchase, 14 daysIndex 100 (Q4 2025)52 in Q3, 62 in early OctoberRoughly halved, partly recovered
Checkout started to completed64%44% (Q3)Most of the decline
Purchase to first payment, 65 days82%62% (Jul to Aug cohort)A drop before the first charge, cause not yet known
First to second, second to third payment84%, 72%78%, 67%Down about 5 to 6 points each
Payment events that are not first purchases79% (Oct 2025)88% (Aug); 94% in a partial OctoberThe business runs on the base (October is inflated by fewer new checkouts)

Acquisition. New-account volume peaked in May and fell through the autumn. Part of that fall is real: in late October a separate session tool also showed paid social traffic falling. But new accounts per session also fell sharply, which points to a tracking or routing change as well, so I would not read the size of the autumn drop as settled.

Conversion. About 81% of the decline was lower conversion inside each channel and about 19% was the shift toward paid social. Most of it sits at the payment step. Two onboarding changes also cost us conversion: in matched windows, a May version converted about 9% worse than the one it replaced, and a June test arm that forced a treatment-type choice converted about 12% worse, with all of the June arm's loss at payment. The rebuilt onboarding lifted treatment choice by about 11 points (browser events, directional) and, on server records, sent about 15% more new accounts to checkout (about 21% against 18%). But about five points fewer checkout starters paid (about 40% against 46%), so purchases per new account ended roughly flat.

After the purchase. First payments within 65 days fell from about 82% to about 62% of buyers, and the later renewal steps slipped about 5 points each. Patients accepted per checkout stayed flat, so it does not obviously look clinical. I do not know the cause yet, and part of it may be measurement: the flag that marks a first payment was still rolling out, and a completed checkout is not the same thing as a billed first invoice. It is the number I most want explained. These are step rates between payments for each purchase cohort; they are not the same measure, or the same period, as the 90-day retention figure in the head of product case study.

Retention. After the portal rebuild, the number of people logging in each month, relative to paying patients, rose from about 1.0 to as high as 1.3. Pages per visit rose too, but I could not see a clear change in what patients did. Medication pause, which lets a patient stop without cancelling, rose from about 13% of paying patients in its first month to about 20% from May. Cancellation events per paying patient fell from about 27 to 31% a month to about 22.5% in a partial October, and weekly cancellations fell about 30% from late August to mid-October. I am not calling that a win yet: a partial month biases this ratio down, and with fewer new patients, fewer people are in their first three months, when half of first-year cancellations happen. Self-serve cancellation requests also fell after the portal launch, but much of that was cancellations moving to the support team, which is why I count cancellation events instead.

Billing retries. In their first week, recovery within 72 hours without a card change rose from about 1.5% to about 10%, card updates within 72 hours fell from 42% to 32%, and total 72-hour recovery was flat (41.0% against 40.7%). It is early and not a causal finding, but so far retries look like they are replacing card updates rather than adding to them.

What I would do differently

  1. Guard the payment step from day one. Checkout completion fell quarter after quarter while we optimized the steps above it. Every test should have used server-side purchases as the primary measure and checkout completion as a guardrail.
  2. Fix the split before the test. A moving traffic share made the first readout of the rebuilt onboarding flattering, and it took several passes to correct.
  3. Instrument new funnels before launch. In October, our newest products' funnels showed no progress past the questionnaire even though people were starting them.
  4. Make QA automation a gate. Suites that run on every merge and every release, covering every live onboarding, are worth more than a bigger test count.
  5. Shorten the queues. Tickets waited about 11 to 12 days in each of two ready-to-deploy states. Waiting, not testing, was the slow part.
  6. Change process sparingly. Every change to how work flows costs the team time to relearn it, so each one has to earn that cost.
  7. Keep humans in the release loop. As AI writes more of the code and launch dates press, every change still needs a human reviewer, and any planned downtime needs a checklist, a realistic window and an all-clear post.
  8. Alert on volume, not only on errors. An automated message that quietly stops sending raises no error, so a drop in send volume should page someone.

The takeaway

The delivery system is the part I am proudest of, because it outlasts any single feature: a team that can test, release and roll back safely can answer a market that changes every month. But shipping more did not, by itself, sell more. This year the market moved the value from the front door to the patient who had already paid, and the work that mattered most followed patients after checkout.

Two questions are still open for me: why fewer buyers reach a first payment, and how much of the autumn fall in new accounts is real. If I had to compress the year into one rule: whenever you improve a step, measure the one after it.

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